Τρίτη 29 Νοεμβρίου 2011

Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan: Time to Buttress Relations

The considerable Iranian leverage in Iraq is already a headache for Turkey whose relations with Iran remain uneven despite improving under Erdogan’s governments, writes Idrees Mohammed.


Middle East Online

On the verge of the US troop withdrawal from Iraq, Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) need to strengthen their relations. President Obama’s determination to withdraw the army is not much different from his predecessor’s decision to send troops into Iraq in 2003, in that both failed to meet US expectations. This resolve, by increasing Kurdish unease and causing Turkish concern about its stake in Iraq, should serve to bring the KRG and Turkey closer.

For the KRG, Turkey is extremely important. The Kurds cannot forget the US negative attitude towards them in the mid-1970s when Henry Kissinger voiced America’s anti-Kurdish stance. Then, in the early 1990s the United States again showed its animosity towards the Kurds when, the Kurds and Shiites, heeding a call by Bush senior, staged an uprising against Baghdad’s Ba’ath regime, only to have it cruelly put down following an implicitly expressed preference by the US to retain the Saddam regime in power.

The current US President has now become a cause of frustration for the Kurds as his administration recalls all US troops from Iraq by the end of the year, thus implying that the US has rejected the possibility of keeping a military presence inside the KRG zone. While the Kurds willingly supported the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and continue to make a contribution towards the protection of American stake in the country, the US is now demonstrating an underlying Machiavellian attitude towards the Kurds. Its failure to meet Kurdish willingness to have US troops in the Kurdistan region causes one to question US intentions towards the KRG: Is the United States cheating the Kurds again?

The presence of American troops in Iraqi Kurdistan is a win-win game for the US, enabling it to watch developments unfolding elsewhere in the country and to build a significant platform to counter the strong foreign interference in Iraq’s internal affairs. Most importantly its presence on the ground enables the United States to exert effective pressure on Iran and have a better authority over Turkey. On the other hand, the Turks view the withdrawal of US troops as an opportunity, and look forward to filling the vacuum created by the US departure. Turkey will then attempt to extend its influence over Iraq. That scenario would provide Turkey with an additional card vis-à-vis the US, in that Turkey affects the US interests in Iraq.

The considerable Iranian leverage in Iraq is already a headache for Turkey whose relations with Iran remain uneven despite improving under Erdogan’s governments. A US withdrawal will bring greater costs when its absence opens the door for Iran to establish greater power over Baghdad. Ankara sees itself as being in ongoing competition with Tehran, challenging the Iranian upper hand in Iraq but also beyond. Iran too will continue its efforts to increase its field of influence over Iraq, especially in the light of US troop withdrawals.

For the Kurds, the US presence in the region is critical. In addition to improving the KRG’s emerging economy it helps ease the Kurd’s other concerns considerably. The Constitution of Iraq has not proved adequate to guide the country. Serious issues have emerged due to its poor implementation with consequent controversies between the Kurds and the central government. In addition to the oil and gas issues, the views of the governments in Erbil and Baghdad differ profoundly on the matter of the “disputed territories” including Kirkuk. How Baghdad will consider Kurdish demands is not promising. The KRG is likely to find itself weak in the face of strong opposition from the central government and the Kurds fear that US withdrawal could spark instability and inter-sectarian violence between Sunni and Shiite groups. In the light of these possibilities the KRG sees itself as highly vulnerable to instability on both political and security grounds.

In addition to the above problems, areas surrounding the Kurdistan Region are in a state of flux. While Syria’s worsening instability is affecting the security of the region as a whole, the KRG is particularly concerned about the plight of Syria’s Kurds; it cannot remain a passive bystander in the face of actions taken against them. Furthermore, both Iran and Turkey have bombed Iraq’s Kurdistan Region in the past, and while the situation regarding Iran has improved, Turkey continues to target PKK bases in the Qandil Mountains.

Despite their difficulties, Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government have mutual interests. Indeed, they are both allies of the United States. Turkey is a neighbor and a logical ally of the KRG. Economically strong it has the potential to assist in improving the economy of the KRG and, as regionally influential it could coordinate economically and politically with the Kurds if their mutual merits and demerits converged, stability and instability in Iraq for instance. Politically and economically Turkey is the strategic conduit for Kurds to reach the outside world. In this regard, the EU countries and the US - Turkey’s close ally - are crucial to the Kurds because it is on them that the KRG has always depended for its legitimacy.

Conversely, the KRG holds significant Turkish national interests. In addition to maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq and providing a reliable energy partner, the Kurds could contribute to defusing Turkey’s domestic tension with its own Kurds. The KRG leadership recently expressed a readiness to help move towards these ends by mediating between Turkey and its Kurds including the PKK, with the aim of reaching an eventual consensus. The KRG could also ease Turkey’s worries regarding the Syrian Kurds. Turkey is afraid that the Syrian regime encourages Syrian Kurds to stand against Turkish interests. By the same token, through the KRG the Kurds, who constitute a key part of Iraq, could increase Turkish influence in Baghdad where Turkey faces a fierce competition from the US, Iran and Arab countries.

Idrees Mohammed, M.A. in International Relations, Warsaw, focuses on Turkey’s foreign policy and Turkey’s policy towards Iraqi Kurdistan Region primarily.

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